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Abstract. Resiliency in process-aware information systems is based on
the availability of recovery flows and alternative data for coping with
missing data. In this paper, we discuss an approach to process and in-
formation modeling to support the specification of recovery flows and
alternative data. In particular, we focus on processes using sensor data
from different sources. The proposed model can be adopted to specify re-
siliency levels of information systems, based on event-based and temporal
constraints.
1 Introduction
As information systems (ISs) are becoming more and more complex and in-
terconnected, the information provided by the system and by other networked
businesses and components can be of varying quality depending on the func-
tioning of the modules of the IS itself, both at the hardware and the software
level.
According to the error-chain paradigm described in [5], an erroneous situ-
ation in a system is not always evident, and becomes apparent when a failure
occurs; such a failure may originate from different error states, which in turn
are possibly originated by different faults in system components. Faults may
be transient or permanent and they may be difficult to diagnose, in particular
in the case of intermittent faults. Therefore, different ways of managing possi-
ble failures have to be considered, depending on the state of the system and
on the possibly originating fault, and the different effects of the faults must be
taken into account, with the goal of resuming normal functioning, or at least
guaranteeing some limited functionality.
In this paper, we focus on designing ISs to make them resilient by design,
i.e., considering the improvement of their reliability in case of expected and
unexpected faults. In [26], we analyzed the characteristics needed for designing a
resilient information system using a process-based representation of the IS. As in
most process-based approaches to IS modeling, the data model is considered only
marginally and often detached from the process model. However, in the design of
a resilient IS, one important aspect are data and their temporal characteristics.
As in the case of faults, also data faults may be transient or permanent, and
different design approaches have to be considered depending on the type of fault
and on the desired resiliency level.
Temporal aspects in conceptual modeling have been studied extensively in
the literature (e.g., [18,7,24,25]), and in particular in connection with the rep-
resentation of events. In this work, inspired by the classification of temporal
features of entity types and relationships proposed by Olive´ et al. in [7], we
discuss its application in the different phases of designing resilient information
systems.
The goal of this paper is to discuss the temporal characteristics of information
in resilient ISs and to propose a model to support resilient IS design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
motivations and our approach to IS resiliency, presenting their characteristics
in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the proposed process and data models,
discussing their application for designing systems of different resiliency levels in
Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we relate our work to the state of the art.
2 The approach
The approach underlying this work consists of the following building blocks:
– A designer provides a specification of the process s/he is dealing with in
some process specification language, e.g., BPMN - Business Process Model
and Notation, CMMN - Case Management Model and Notation, etc.
– In addition to such process specification, the designer provides an infor-
mation model, detailing the data used in the process, both for routing the
control flow (process data) and needed during tasks’ execution.
– Such process model and information model are the main artifacts over which
a design-time resilience analysis should be conducted, in order to identify
possible breaches, propose alternative specifications, etc.
From an abstract point of view, our approach is a method that, given a
process and an information model specifications, returns a quantification of how
much such specifications allow the deployment of a resilient process, and possible
guidelines for improving such specifications are offered. The availability of such
a conceptual tool is quite important: organizations operate in ecosystems, in
which each actor is a potential source of failures, and therefore the awareness on
resilience is a critical element during the design of an IS and its applications.
Some previous work has attempted to analyze the issues of resilience, but
generally satisfying resilience requirements is considered mainly as a run-time
issue, as it is related to the ability to cope with unplanned situations: several
approaches [27] have been proposed to keep business processes running even
when some unplanned exceptions occur, by enacting countermeasures. Clearly,
if we focus on what to do in case of a failure, this approach seems to be the
only possibility. However, if we focus on what is affected when a failure occurs,
some improvements can be done also at design-time. In [26] we proposed an
approach for assessing the resilience of business processes modeled with CMMN,
and assigning to the specification a value in the range [0..3] in order to measure
how much the specification has been designed with resilience in mind. In this
work, we focus on providing more specific details on the conceptual modeling
languages to be used during the specification, focusing in particular on repre-
senting temporal aspects which play an important role for resilience, as it will
be shown in the following examples.
3 Resiliency scenarios
In this section, we describe some characteristics of IS resilience discussing some
example scenarios (shown in Table 1), covering a broad variety of typologies of
information systems with resiliency requirements. We take into consideration the
information sources needed by the scenarios and their characteristics and possible
actions to improve resilience. In the following of the paper we will discuss how to
model and evaluate impacts of possible failures, focusing on resilient IS design.
In the first type of scenario, periodic reporting based on sensor data is consid-
ered. In this case, e.g., considered in [26], the input source is a stream of collected
sensor data, and the system is based on the data collection interval and it can
be influenced also by its frequency. Where data sources are considered unreli-
able, there is the need of investigating if other sources of information (current
or historical) are available. In general, this is done at run time, to recover from
failures on an ad-hoc basis, while anticipating failures at design time designing
alternatives could make the recovery phase more rapid and systematic.
In the second scenario, inspired from the work presented in [13], self-healing
processes with mechanisms for recovering from failures through partial rework
are discussed. The approach, which uses planning techniques to derive repair
plans, is based on modeling dependencies among data being used in business
processes. In this case, the impact of erroneous data is evaluated, and pre-
designed compensation and recovery tasks are used to dynamically generate
recovery plans.
In alerting systems, such as for monitoring production in factories or in smart
buildings (e.g., [37]), the focus is on monitoring the current situation to detect
anomalies. As in the first case, alternative sources of information should be
planned, and the timeliness of data is important.
Finally, a data movement scenario is considered, where moving large quan-
tities of data takes time, and resilience could be weakened due to late/missing
data. In this case, preparation strategies to anticipate possible failures can be
envisioned, such as transferring data in advance, pre-selecting data, changing
data location and redundancy policies [10].
At design time “what if” analyses of possible failures in data availability
can support the design of more resilient systems. Other data quality properties
could also be considered (data which are not accurate, that cannot be trusted,
incomplete, and so on), however in the present paper we focus on their time-
dependent characteristics and we attempt to derive a meta-model to support
resilient IS design and to study the properties of the system being designed.
Type of sce-
nario
Description Critical input
sources
Characteristics
of sources
Compensation
Periodic
reporting
Analysis of sen-
sor data
Sensors data col-
lection
Interval of collec-
tion, frequency
Alternative
source, using
data from previ-
ous periods
Self-healing
processes
Tasks exchang-
ing info / Results
of previous tasks
External sources Any type Reworking tasks
Alerting sys-
tem
E.g., factory
monitoring
(device)
Sensors data col-
lection
Interval of collec-
tion, frequency
Alternative
source
Data move-
ment
Transferring
large documents
Documents
available from
different loca-
tions
Documents do
not vary in time
Alternative loca-
tion
Table 1. Scenarios characteristics.
4 Modeling processes and data for resiliency
4.1 Modeling processes
Process modeling usually relies on imperative/procedural notations where the
control flow represents the element around which the activities and the data are
organized. In the recent period, BPMN3 has emerged as the standard de facto
notation used to model processes according to this activity-centric approach. As
also mentioned in [11], activity-centric modeling notations, although intuitive
and close to the way of thinking of the process modelers, suffers from some
drawbacks especially when resilience needs to be captured. In fact, activity-
centric modeling makes a clear distinction between the normal execution and
the exceptional executions. In some way, the modeler is forced to identify which
is the right way to enact the business process and to decorate this process with
additional activities that might be enacted only if some particular situations
occur. In case of resilient processes, the normal execution could be more complex
and depends on several variables that could also be unknown at design time. For
this reason, we suggest to revert to artifact-centric notations as they provide
the required flexibility with the main limitation that the modeling could become
cumbersome.
Among the several alternatives, like GSM, Declare, and many others [21], in
this paper we adopt CMMN4 as artifact-centric modeling language. With a lot of
synergies with BPMN (they are both proposed by OMG), CMMN provides a set
of constructs that help the modeler to design a business process in terms of states
in which the activities can be (or cannot be) performed. Instead of imposing a
3 cf. http://www.bpmn.org/
4 cf. http://www.omg.org/spec/CMMN/1.0
specific control flow and of considering such flow as the ideal one, the modeler can
define conditions under which the state of system can be considered acceptable
and to enable, or disable, activities.
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Fig. 1. CMMN model of an IoT-based case study [26].
In the next few paragraphs, the basic elements of CMMN useful to under-
stand the content of this paper are introduced. To this aim, we refer to the
example shown in Fig. 1 representing a real case study [26] concerning a process
in charge of collecting data coming from a set of sensors. These sensors monitor
the behavior of the customers inside a shop. Every week, these data are analyzed
to create a report that constitutes the basis for creating marketing reports useful
to identify marketing strategies (e.g., how to better distribute the items in the
shelves, to identify the best products, and so on).
The main concept of CMMN is the case that is defined by the case file (data
managed in a case), the case plan (how the case evolves), and the case roles
(the stakeholders). Focusing on the first two aspects, CMMN does not focus on
the order in which the activities are performed, but only on the dependencies
between the different states of execution of the process based on information
stored in the case file.
In more detail, a case plan (represented as a manilla folder and which must be
unique for a given model) is a composition of stages (represented by a rectangle
shape with angled corners). The stages represent the episodes of a case which,
in turn, could contain other stages or tasks, i.e., atomic units of work. Stages
and tasks can be defined as mandatory (with a solid border) or discretionary
(with a dashed border) to identify which are the elements of the case that actors
must or could execute. Tasks and stages can be further characterized by the
entry and exit criteria represented by, namely, white and black diamonds. These
criteria define when a task or a stage opens and when they can be considered
as closed. Finally, listeners (represented by circles) represent events that might
occur during the execution of the case plan and that could determine the start
or the end of a task or stage.
Concerning the information model, although this is a crucial element of
artifact-based modeling notations, CMMN simply includes the possibility to
specify data objects (typical document shape) without any specific restriction
on the format or the content. If, from the one side, this leaves the freedom to
consider any type of data, on the other side the model cannot express any type of
data semantics. For this reason, as also proposed in [26], an extension of the in-
formation model where also discretionary data and a more rich set of association
types between stage/task and objects are proposed.
Having quickly introduced the main elements of CMMN, and moving back
to the case study in Fig. 1, here the case plan is composed by three main stages
(i.e., sensor data acquisition, data analysis, and marketing analysis). While the
data analysis starts every Monday and closes when a report is produced, the
other two stages always run as neither entry nor exit criteria are defined. The
entire case closes when the conversion rate (the ratio between people entering
into the shop w.r.t. the people that buy some goods) becomes acceptable for the
shop owner. Finally, as defined in the sensor data acquisition stage, it is possible
to express some dependencies between the tasks. In fact, the sensor reading tasks
start only when the sensors have been completely installed.
As previously mentioned, the information model provided by CMMN is not
so rich. For this reason, we can simply add data objects to the stages to clarify
which are the data that are considered (without any possibility to specify the
nature of the operations on them) when a stage is running.
4.2 Modeling time varying information
As discussed above, CMMN provides a high level view on the data objects needed
in the different stages. For supporting resiliency at design time, it is clear that
more information is needed on the data being used in the process. We adopt a
notation based on UML class diagrams to represent data objects, their compo-
nents, and their relationships.
However, as discussed by Olive` et al. [7], the notation of UML class diagrams
assumes that “the information base contains the current instances of entity and
relationship types”. On the other hand, temporal information about the available
data for the process is essential in processes such as the one shown in Fig. 1. In
fact, for instance, the report is produced periodically from sensor data that must
be available for the period considered in the report. Sensor data also need to be
defined, as they are acquired from sensors within the considered period, and
therefore they are a time series taken as an input for a given stage. It has also
to be noted that the process is continuing, producing reports periodically, until
its exit goal is reached. Therefore, in general, several reports will be produced
periodically, starting from different sensor data.
In Olive` et al. [24], two dimensions are considered: durability and frequency.
The durability feature is used to describe if an entity type is instantaneous or
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Fig. 2. Time series representation for sensor data.
durable. The frequency feature is defined so that “entity type E is single if all its
entities can only be instance of E during one classification interval. Otherwise,
E is intermittent.”
Starting from the dimensions described above, six ways for classifying an
entity or a relationship type wrt. its temporal features are proposed in [7]:
– Instantaneous, single, if two entity types can be related only once, at a given
time.
– Instantaneous, intermittent. If two nti y types can be related several times,
at different time instants.
– Durable, single. Two entity types can be related for a period of time, only
once.
– Durable, intermittent. Two entity types can be related for a period of time,
several times.
– Permanent. A relationship once established does not change.
– Constant. For unchanging entities.
The representation of input sources for data in our case study of Fig. 1 can
be represented using the notation proposed in [7], to be able to represent the
temporal characteristics of entities used in the model. In Fig. 2, we show how
the Sensor data source is formed: as it is a stream of data, it is considered a
durable intermittent entity type in our case study, where the intervals indicate
the periods in which data are gathered. Its lifespan is indicated as a set of
intervals. Note that if the stream is always correctly working, it will contain a
single interval from the beginning of the measurement to the current date. If an
interruption in the stream occurs, a new lifespan interval is created instead. So
the intervals indicate all periods in which Sensor data measurements are actually
collected.
5 Analyzing resiliency data properties
During a generic process enactment, unplanned situations might occur. Depend-
ing on the nature of the raised issues, the magnitude of their impact varies and
one or more activities may be involved. At the same time, different counter-
measures can be taken to mitigate these negative effects. As an example, in a
cyber-physical process for many reasons the sensors might not be able to send
data, and an alternative source of information might be considered, to be able
to equally infer relevant behaviors to be monitored, or at least in a slightly de-
graded form. Another example is about frequencies (temporal constraints): a
sensor might not be able to send information very frequently, still alternative
techniques can be adopted to infer missing data or to calculate aggregated mea-
surements. Similarly to what is usually done in emergency management [32,20],
where a preparedness phase aims to improve the systems by learning from the
previous emergencies, in [26] we propose an approach which helps the process
designers in improving their process models by considering the previous experi-
ences in failures generated by data unavailability. For this, the ability to model
the process and the information model and possible temporal constraints for the
purpose of resilience awareness is crucial.
Having clearly modeled the process and the information model, allows the
development of an approach to categorize resilience characteristics, then to de-
fine resiliency levels, and to model the resilience improvement aspects from a
modeling perspective. With the modeling approach previously introduced, it is
possible to analyze a (possibly multi-party) business process resilience from a
data perspective: data dependencies among the involved parties and relation-
ships between process activities and data are taken into account to identify the
sources of possible failures, and how the process can be better modeled to make
it resilient with respect to these failures. We are able to consider Parties, i.e.,
actors involved in the process. Then we deal with Tasks, i.e., units of work per-
formed by parties, which consume data as input and produce data as output.
The data produced by a task must be required by at least another party, and
Data, i.e., units of storage used by the data producer to store/write data and
by the data consumer to read such data. Producers and consumers are parties
performing tasks. Data can also be used to verify the entry and exit conditions,
thus to realize when a stage or task starts or terminates. As previously intro-
duced, the temporal constraints over read/write of data are crucial in modeling
resilient processes.
Resilience of processes depends on both the reliability of the tasks and the
lack of data availability. The reliability of the task concerns the possibility that
one or more tasks cannot be executed: i.e., the required infrastructure to per-
form the job is not available, also including the human resources for which the
unavailability of data can block the execution of manual tasks. On the other side,
lack of data availability (including a wrong frequency of the data) is a situation
in which the data consumed by a task are not available. This situation can occur
for different reasons. Firstly, it may be directly connected to the task reliability,
as all the tasks by definition produce data and these data are relevant for at least
one of the participating parties, and problems on tasks may have also the side
effect to make data unavailable. Moreover, there are situations in which tasks are
properly working, but the returned data, although available, do not have a suffi-
cient quality level to enable processing, thus they can be considered unavailable.
Completeness, timeliness, and accuracy are some of quality parameters through
which we can define the acceptable level of data quality for considering the data
available [6]. For this reason, the definition of the data could be coupled with
the definition of quality levels that are considered acceptable for a task that is
using such data.
Having modeled the process and the information model, it is then possible
to define levels of resilience on the basis of the ability of the process to adjust
the possible unexpected failures. We aim to classify the way resilience can be
considered and obtained, in terms of preparedness to unexpected events which
might be caused or have impact on data availability. In particular, the following
four levels of designed resilience have been identified:
– Level 0 – None. At this level business processes are designed without tak-
ing into account the data unavailability that might cause failures during the
execution. As a consequence, also countermeasures to be adopted in case
of critical situations are not defined. The designed process only reflects the
wishful scenario where it is assumed that all the parties correctly execute
their tasks and all the data are transferred among them as expected. Al-
though a process design of this type can be useful to define the agreement
between the parties, no support is given to the resilience.
– Level 1 - Failure-awareness. A first step for improving the process design
is to make the process aware that there are possible sources of failure, so there
will be the need to make it resilient. In this work, we consider failures caused
by data unavailability, which might impact on one or more tasks of the same
party that is producing such data, or tasks performed by other parties. For
this reason, failure-aware business processes are designed to have a clear map
of which are the relevant data subject to failures, as well as the impact of
these failures. The analysis of potential failures depends on several factors:
amount of data, how the data are collected, how the data are stored. As an
example, data stored on a local server have a probability of failure that is
lower than data stored on a smart device connected to a wireless network.
Similarly, if data created by one party and used by several parties becomes
unavailable, the impact of this failure will be greater than the one produced
by data created and consumed by the same party.
– Level 2 – Identifying alternatives for data and goals. For processes
classified in this level, the model of the process makes an initial attempt to
overcome possible failures, whose nature and impact have been defined with
the previous level. In more detail, there are two aspects to be taken into
account:
• Alternative Data: based on the information about the source of failures
and the potential impact of these failures, the designer can decide to
include in the process model the alternative data. In this way, starting
from the data having more probability of failures and greater impact, the
designer has to specify if there are alternative data sources and how to
reach them. A more precise model requires an analysis of the gap between
the quality of the data in the original data source with respect to the
quality of the data in the alternative data source. The issue of quality of
data has been extensively addressed in traditional information systems,
e.g., [6], but the quality of big data (which includes sensor-generated
data) is still to be precisely defined [12].
• Alternative Goal : as the process resilience implies to mitigate the effect of
a failure, a possible mitigation includes revising the initial expectations of
the process to achieve a given goal. The designer defines, for each party,
a new goal that represents a status that can terminate the execution of
the process in an acceptable way. If the initial goal corresponds to the
optimal goal, the alternative goal could be considered as a best-effort
goal.
It is worth noting that the business process models at this level do not
prescribe any specific actions to cope with the failures at run-time. For this
reason, a model at this level only supports who is in charge of executing the
process, to select, in case of failures, new data sources as well as to decide
to consider satisfactory the result of the execution even if the initial goal is
not possible to be fulfilled, accepting a weaker goal.
In [26], we propose an extension to CMMN to represent alternative data,
represented with document shaped icons with dashed borders as shown in
Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. CMMN model extended with alternative data [26].
Using the data model introduced in Section 4.2, we can represent also the
relationships between entities in the process. As shown in Fig. 4, the Report
to be produced for a given interval is based on the Sensor Data for a period,
but can also use as an alternative Public data available for the period of
interest of the report. The source of data that will be actually selected (either
Sensor Data or the alternative Public Data) will become permanently liked
to a given report using it.
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Fig. 4. Alternative data sources representation.
– Level 3 – Defining alternative actions. At this level, processes have been
designed by considering also actions to be taken in case of failures. Design-
time mechanisms are conceived to be able to (semi)-automatically move the
process to an acceptable state when unexpected or unplanned failures occur.
Based on the information about the alternatives (both data and goal), the
designer can embed in the business process how these alternatives could
be effectively managed. New tasks can be added to the process to express
the activities to be performed in order to improve the quality of the data
alternatives to a quality level equivalent to the original service.
With these levels of resilience, we aim at supporting the process designer in
understanding if the resilience is modeled, and if there is room to improve the
process model by specifying possible alternative solutions. As an example, once
the designer understands that the modeled processes are at level 0, the first step
should be to start considering the evolution of the data in the process.
6 Related work
Research on resilient systems encompasses several disciplines, such as psychol-
ogy [34], ecology [14], sociology [3] and engineering [17]. In information systems,
resilience engineering has its roots in the study of safety-critical systems [17],
i.e., systems aimed to ensure that organizations operating in turbulent and inter-
connected settings achieve high levels of safety despite a multitude of emerging
risks, complex tasks, and constantly increasing pressures. A system is considered
as resilient if its capabilities can be adapted to new organizational requirements
and changes that have not been explicitly incorporated into the existing system’s
design [23]. In the BPM field, cf. [23] and [28], this means that respective busi-
ness processes are able to automatically adapt themselves to such changes. Over
the last years, change management in BPM has been mainly tackled through
the notions of process flexibility [27] and risk-aware BPM [31,30].
On the one hand, research on process flexibility has focused on four major
flexibility needs, namely (i) variability [15,16,27], (ii) looseness [2,19], (iii) adap-
tation [29,22], and (iv) evolution [8,9]. The ability to deal with changes makes
process flexibility approaches a required but not sufficient mean for building
resilient BPM systems. In fact, there exists a (seemingly insignificant but) rele-
vant gap between the concepts of flexibility and resilience: (i) process flexibility
is aimed at producing “reactive” approaches that reduce failures from the outset
or deal with them at run-time if any “known” disturbance arises; (ii) process
resilience requires “proactive” techniques accepting and managing change “on-
the-fly” rather than anticipating it, in order to allow a system to address new
emerging and unforeseeable changes with the potential to cascade. On the other
hand, while relatively close to the concept of risk-aware BPM, which evaluates
operational risks on the basis of historical threat probabilities (with a focus on
the “cause” of disturbances and events), resilient BPM shifts attention on the
“realized risks” and their consequences, to improve risk prevention and mitiga-
tion, and therefore aim at complementing conventional risk-aware approaches.
Surprisingly, the fact is that there exists only a limited number of research
works investigating resilience of BPM systems [4,36,35], and they are all at con-
ceptual level. For example, the work of Antunes and Mourao [4] derives a set of
fundamental requirements aimed at supporting resilient BPM. The approach of
Zahoransky et al. [36] investigates the use of process mining [1] to create prob-
ability distributions on time behavior of business processes. Such distributions
can be used as indicators to monitor the level of resilience at run-time and indi-
cate possible countermeasures if the level drops. Finally, the work [35] provides
a support framework and a set of measures based on the analysis of previous
process executions to realize and evaluate resilience in the BPM context.
In our previous work [26], we started to approach IS resiliency in a systematic
way, with the goal of defining possible levels of resiliency, and of investigating
which models, or variants of models, can support the design of resilient IS.
Considering conceptual models, there is a specific need for conceptualizing
the evolution of the information. To this purpose, we considered previous work
on the representation of time and events at conceptual level. The fundamental
concepts for representing temporal data have been discussed and presented in
[18]. In the direction of conceptual modeling, the information systems group
lead by Antoni Olive´ has given an important contribution, studying possible
extensions for modeling temporal aspects of information and events in IS design
(see e.g., [7,25,24]. Part of the work presented in this paper has been based on
the classification and notations proposed by Olive´ et al. for extending UML with
temporal features.
If compared with the aforementioned works, our research aims to provide
guidelines to model resilient-by-design business processes by focusing on the data
exchanged between the activities composing the process, an aspect neglected in
the existing approaches to process resilience. In this work, we have tackled the
issue of modeling the temporal dimension of the data, in order to have a coherent
approach both in the process and in the information model.
7 Conclusions and future research lines
Adopting design-time models to represent resilience aspects allows the IS de-
signer to take a “preparedness” approach, to anticipate what should be done in
case of possible occurring or anticipated failures, to guarantee a certain level of
resilience. Following a continuous improvement approach, we propose to analyze
temporal features of data over time evaluating past failures of the system. Fur-
ther work is needed in this direction, with the goal of improving resilience. A
focus on a preparedness phase can help improving the models by learning from
previous failures. Further modeling and analysis techniques are also needed to
represent possible interferences among processes, as unexpected consequences
may arise over time from apparently unrelated processes [33].
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